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From personal tragedy to social 
oppression: the medical model and social 
theories of disability 
Martin Sullivan• 
Over the last decade the medical model with its individualized, psychologized and 
medicalized account of disability has been rejected in favour of a sociological 
account that views disabil.ity as an oppressive social creation. In these later 
accounts, the focus shifts from individual impairment to the disabling effects of 
social organization and structures designed around, and for, non-disabled people. 
This paper compares and contrasts the conceptual .and theoretical approaches of 
both these models. l.n .the light of these models, disability social policy, particularly 
~as .it affects the employment of disabled people, is examined. 
1. Introduction 
~Over the last 15 to 20 years there has been a profound change in the epistemological 
basis of the discourse on disability, as disabled people have increasingly set the agenda 
for, and undertaken, studies in disability. Prior to this, the medical model dominated with 
the disciplines of medicine and psychology providing the conceptual and theoretical . 
framework through which disability was approached. Disability was thus viewed as 
primarily a medical concern of functional impait rnent, and the experience of disability as 
dependent upon a series of psychological adjusunents. With its emphasis on functional 
impaiunents and individual adjustm~ent to them, the medical model generated a view of 
disabled people as the pathetic victints of some tragic circumstance. According to 
Michael Oliver (1990), the resulting "personal tragedy theory of disability" has been so 
pervasive that it has provided the "grand theory" underpinning most studies on disability. 
Disabled people clearly felt it was up to themselves to provide a critique of the 
medical model. Drawing on their own experiences and those of other disabled people, 
these writers developed a social theory of disability in which the social, economic, 
political and ideological structures of capitalism are examined for the roles they play in 
"producing" disability and disabled people. 
In this paper I will compar·e and contrast the medical and social models of disability 
and then, in the light of these models, evaluate social policy pertaining to disability. 
Particular attention will be paid to the way policy shapes the employment patterns of 
disabled people. Before I proceed, a disclaimer. 
Throughout this paper I have chosen to use the te11n "disabled people" rather than the 
term "people with disabilities". There is much debate over terminology within the 
disability community and amongst the predominantly non-disabled professionals that 
work with disabled people. It is argued that the "people with disabilities" declares the 
value of the person first, thus reducing the disability to a mere appendage. Whilst many 
professionals and disabled people have adopted the sanitized "people with disabilities", I 
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believe their position is becoming increasingly less tenable. Firstly, as the disability 
pride movement grows, disabled people are increasingly owning their disabilities and 
demanding acceptance as they are, as disabled people. To me, excusing one's self as "a 
person with a disability" indicates an implicit acceptance of "able-body" hegemony which 
defines disabled people as flawed and inferior. Also, the irony of a "disabled person" 
writing for a learned journal should not be lost Secondly, many disabled people argue 
that the lived reality makes their disability more than an appendage, it is an essential part 
of self. In such instances, to talk about the person and the disability separately is 
nonsense. 
2. The medical model of disability 
The context in which the medical model of disability became established is 
eighteenth century Europe and the emergence of the Welfare State. In England, the Poor 
Laws marked the beginnings of the Welfare State in that they established an implicit 
system of obligation between society and individuals. Individual needs would be met 
through work; the State would meet the needs of those not in work. Since not all people 
were able or willing to work, the State was only obliged to meet the needs of those 
involuntarily out of work. Thus, categories of "deserving" paupers were created in the 
administration of welfare programmes: "In very early descriptions of welfare programmes 
in European towns [there is] only reference to special treatment for the aged and infinn, 
for lunatics and defectives, invalids ... and impotent beggars" (Stone, 1985, p.26). 
Clearly these categories would be subsumed under the generic "disabled" today. But 
"disability" is a fairly modem concept associated with modem clinical medicine, and under 
the Poor Laws these were essentially legal categories. Accordingly, judgments about 
inability to work, or the legitimacy of an individual choice not to work, were made by 
priests, judges, juries, teachers or public officials without reference to physicians. This, 
however, was not an entirely satisfactory state of affairs. Traditional categories of welfare 
dependency e.g. age or widowhood, could be confiuned by disinterested officials with 
reference to public records of birth and death. Disability was always problematic as no 
single condition of "disability" was universally recognized, and because physical or 
mental incapacity could always be feigned for the secondary gain of welfare (Stone, 
1985). What was required was an objective index to measure capacity to work, a means 
to quantify incapacity, a procedure whereby disability would be objectified in individuals 
and thus legitimate their claims to social aid. Medicine was to provide the solution to 
this dilemma. 
Firstly, major changes in the medical concept of disease occurred in the nineteenth 
century with the discoveries of bacteriologists Pasteur and Koch. The resulting "geuu 
theory of illness and disease" was to both absolve the individual from any responsibility 
for, or control over, his or her condition as well as to legitimate medicine as a science. 
Secondly, technological breakthroughs in the development of instruments such as the 
stethoscope, the ophthalmoscope, the X-ray machine and the microscope equipped 
physicians with an array of devices which gave them information about the body 
independent of patients' descriptions. These new diagnostic methods enabled the 
physician to assume the role of disinterested public official who could distinguish 
between genuine disability and feigned disability on the basis of objective, scientific 
measurement (Stone, 1985; Turner, 1987). 
With these tools of legitimation, medical science was incorporated as an apparatus of 
the State that focused on disability purely in teuns of individual, functional impaiunent 
and capacity to work. Thus, separated out, specialised institutions arose to care for 
disabled people; asylums for the mad and hospitals for the physically impaired. 
The segregation of the physically impaired in institutions made possible 3 
developments which greatly increased medical control over the lives of the "disabled". 
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Firstly, etiology became the primary concern, and specialization permitted people with 
different types of disabilities to be placed in separate diagnostic categories (Hahn, 1987). 
Secondly, the hospital environment encouraged the growth of helping professionals such 
as nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, social workers, counsellors, etc., so 
much so that today "there is almost no aspect of [a disabled person's] life for which there 
is no professional" (Finkelstein, 1980, p.11 ). Thirdly, greater numbers of physically 
impaired people survived as a result of successful developments in medical practises thus 
strengthening the connection between disabled people and institutions. These "survivors" 
were in tum made dependent upon the programmes of the professionals within 
institutions. And since these professionals "either work in organisations hierarchically 
dominated by doctors or have their professional practice structured by a discourse based 
upon 'the medical model" (Oliver, 1990, p.48), it was inevitable that the lives of disabled 
people w,ere made subject to medical power. 
Tentacles of medical power reached beyond the institutions to control the lives of 
disabled people as medical professionals were authorized by the State to gatekeep welfare 
disbursements to physically and mentally impaired people. Doctors, occupational 
therapists and social workers became involved in the allocation of financial benefits, in 
assessing individuals for specialized equipment such as wheelchairs and hearing aids, in 
deciding educational needs and m,easuring work capabilities and potentials (Oliver, 1990), 
in determining the type of living arrangements best suited for individuals, and in 
authorizing structural changes to homes at the State's expense. To r~eceive statutory 
provision, disabled people were required to submit themselves to the medical gaze to have 
their "condition" validated. By virtue of this requirement, a particular perception of 
disability and disabled people became entrenched in the buJieaucratic and public mind. 'The 
medicalizing of disability was complete. 
Psychology has proved a natural adjunct of the medical model's tendency to define 
disability in terms of individual deficit. All psychological theories of disability share an 
assumption that the onset of disability does not just bring about physical ,changes, but 
also changes of mental function. A series of psychological mechanisms of adjustment 
have thus been identified (Cohn, 1961; Fink, 1967), or more appropriately borrowed from 
other areas such as death and dying, which an individual must work through before he or 
she can come to terms with his or her disability (Albr~echt, 1976). For example, a study 
identified a 4-stage process involving shock, denial, anger and depression by which newly 
disabled paraplegics come to teuus with their disability (Weller and Miller, 1977). He.noe 
psychological studies tend to focus on the emotional manag~ement of the physiological 
and psychological implications of disability at an individual level (Sullivan, 1988). 
The conceptual framework provided by psychological models of adjustment has been 
sev,erely criticized on theoretical grounds (Finkelstein, 1980), methodological grounds 
(Oliver, 1981), and the grounds that it does not correspond with the actual ~experience of 
disability (Sutherland, 1981). Psychological explanations are also problematic in that by 
ignoring issues of social prejudice and institutional discrimination they treat the disabled 
individual as ultimately the source of any problem (Longman, 1987). From this 
perspective it is easy to see why medical and psychological ~explanations .make such good 
bedfellows and why they have dominated the discourse on disability: not only do they 
both adhere to the same empirical "scientific" tradition, but both are also politically 
convenient insofar as they individualize and naturalize (i.e. accepted as unproblematic 
givens of the condition) the "problem" of disability. 
It would be churlish not to acknowledge the vast improvements medical science and 
medical technology have brought to the liv,es of many disabled people. Previously 
disabling conditions can now be cured, prevented through vaccination (polio) or greatly 
ameliorated through surgical and physical medicine (spinal bifida, spinal cord injury). 
Unfortunately, the benefits of medical science have not co.me without cost; they have 
placed a mortgage over the lives of disabled people . Arguably the heaviest payments are 
I . . . . . . . . . . 
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extracted by the way in which medical science has shaped the social perceptions of 
disability and disabled people. 
Social perceptions engendered by the medical model 
Segregated in institutions, physically impaired people provided a pool of subjects for 
medical assistance, investigation and experimentation. Consequently, the medical model 
came to be accepted as the authoritative account of disability; an account in which 
disability was, until recently, defined almost exclusively from a medical perspective that 
focused on functional impaii naents (Hahn, 1987). It is not surprising therefore, that both 
society and disabled people became obsessed with disabled bodies and the degree to which 
they diverge from nonnative standards (Finkelstein, 1980). Or that physically impaired 
individuals have been conceptualized as being deficient - the victims of some lamentable 
happening or circumstance (Finkelstein, 1980; Sutherland, 1981; Oliver, 1983). This 
view has not only cast disabled people as tragic, pitiable victims, but also influenced 
most of the studies on disability by providing a ready-made "personal tragedy theory of 
disability" (Oliver, 1990). 
Medicine has linked disability with disease and pathology. Hence, disability is seen 
to reside in individuals who are biologically flawed and thus negatively changed both 
physically and psychologically. Consequently, disabled people are perceived as not only 
looking different, but as being different in their cognitive processes, responses and 
actions. They must therefore be treated differently, approached with caution or controlled 
through exclusion. 
Other responses flow from the perception of disability as a disease-like condition. 
Disabled people should be treated as if they are sick and should have extended to them the 
mature tolerance automatically given to a sick friend or neighbour. Alternatively, the 
disease-like taint surrounding disabled people often elicits very complex feelings of fear, 
revulsion, guilt and anxiety in the healthy (Gliedman and Roth, 1980). 
Institutionalization removed disabled people from their families and communities 
making them variously objects of curiosity, fear and loathing. Isolation in hospitals 
fostered a perception of disabled people as being the passive recipients of aid; dependent, 
powerless and always needing non-disabled people to do things for them; disabled people 
become less than human in the eyes of the wider community. They became referred to as 
"invalids". That is, "in-valids", negations of what it is to be human. 
Specialization has fragmented the disabled community into a variety of groups 
organized around, and divided by, the particularities of their conditions e.g. epileptics, 
tetraplegics. Instead of being united by the commonalities they share as disabled people, 
specialization has served to depoliticize disability by treating the entire social group as a 
collection of disabled individuals rather than as an oppressed group. It also depoliticiz,es 
by reinforcing the notion of disability as individual pathology. This in turn 
individualizes the "problems" faced by disabled people; thus naturalized, the problems 
become inherent to the condition - a concern for doctors or psychologists, not the broader 
social environment 
Notwithstanding the dominance of medicalized perceptions, a change is occurring 
within the social relations of disability. This change has been precipitated by disabled 
people as greater numbers are seen functioning independently in the community, by the 
growth of organizations of disabled people and the emerging group identity, and finally, 
by their spokespeople who are increasingly active in articulating their own perceptions of 
their situation. This state of affairs has prompted one writer to characterize disability 
today as a: 
paradoxical situation involving the state of the individual (his or her 
impairment) and the state of society (the social restrictions which are imposed 
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on an individual) ... Attitudes may be held towards the individual who is 
impaired, or toward the social barriers (Finkelstein, 1980, p.6). 
In the preceding analysis of the medical model we hav~e looked at one side of the 
disability paradox and how disability came to imply personal tragedy, passivity and 
dependency. The other side of the disability paradox, the social creation of disability, is 
examined in the next section. 
3. The social theory ~of disability: th~e social oppression/ 
creation model 
Ov~er the last 15 to 20 years another model has arisen to challenge the distortions 
inherent in the medical model. This model, based upon the lived ~experiences of disabled 
people, rejects the individualized, psychologized and medicalized account for a 
sociological account which shows disability to be a social creation located within the 
institutionalized practices of society. In these later accounts the focus shifts from 
individual impairment to the disabling effects of social organization and structures 
designed around and for "able" bodies. A critique of the disableist ideology that operates 
to maintain these discriminatory structures is part and parcel of a social theory of 
disability. 
Social theorists of disability begin with a re-definition of disability which involves a 
twofold classification: 
Impairment is lacking part or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organism or 
mechanism of the body; and disability is the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused 
by a ~contemporary social organization which takes no or little account of people who 
have physical impainnents., and thus excludes them from the mainstream (Finkelstein, 
1980). 
This definition shifts the locus of disability from individuals, and locates it squarely 
in society and social organizations that discriminate. Following from this 
conceptualization, some writers see disability as a set of ideas, an ideology which 
maintains disableist structures. In this view, disability is no more or no less than "social 
oppression". Physically impaired people are oppressed by both attitudes and the built 
~environment which deny physical, intellectual and e.motional access to the wider social 
milieu. In this oppressive process, physically impaired people are socially created 
(negated?) as disabled people. 
However, this does not explain why physically impaired people are socially 
oppressed nor how they have been recreated as disabled people. Ideas and attitudes do not 
exist in a vacuum and do not oppress unless they have a material basis. So to move 
beyond idealism and idealist explanations of disability, a materialist analysis which 
considers the economic, social and political structures which underpin the ideology of 
disability is requir~ed. Building on his earlier work and that of others in the area, 
especially Fink~elstein (1980), Michael Oliver presents the most comprehensive and 
theoretically developed materialist analysis thus far, in his The politics of disablement 
(1990). 
Using historical materialism as a framework, Oliver argues that the perception and 
social location of disabled people depends upon the mode of production, the siz.e of the 
economic surplus and how it is distributed amongst the population as a whole. From 
this viewpoint, Oliver shows how the oppression of disabled people is, firstly, a direct 
consequence of changes in the economic mode of production. In the cooperatively 
organized, pre-capitalist (feudal) mode of production and the cottage based industry of the 
time, the great majority of disabled people were not precluded from participating in the 
production process. For example, deaf people ~could learn agricultural tasks by 
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observation, and blind people, without special training, could perform routine tasks 
involving tactile skills in familiar surroundings (Topliss, 1975). 
However, the transition to capitalist factory production was accompanied by the rise 
of individual waged labour and the ideological construction of the "able-bodied" worker 
who could operate complex factory technology. This becomes important in relationship 
to disability for it is the construction of "able-bodied" and "able-minded" individuals 
which is significant the ideological construction of the disabled individual follows as the 
antithesis of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness. Disabled people were subsequently 
expelled from the workforce to be segregated within their homes and, in the ideological 
climate of "able-bodiedness", disablement became a source of shame and disabled people a 
social problem. For those families who could not cope with their disabled members, 
particularly working-class families already under pressure in the new capitalist social 
order\ institutional care became an option (Oliver, 1990). 
For Oliver, the individualism underpinning capitalism is buttressed by the peripheral 
ideologies of medicalization and personal tragedy theory. Medicalization legitimates 
medical intervention and shifts attention to individual impairment; personal tragedy 
theory underpins social policy which aims to adapt disabled individuals to society rather 
than effecting structural change to facilitate their inclusion. Hence, in capitalist society, 
disability is defined by the hegemony of able-bodiedness which is constituted by the 
ideologies of individualism, medicalization and personal tragedy theory. 
Oliver was able to show in his discussion on the cultural production of disability, 
that disabled people are not treated as inferior in all societies, nor at all historical points. 
The inferior position in tettns of income, employment, education, housing or transport 
that disabled people occupy in capitalist societies is therefore, neither natural nor 
inevitable. It is the product of the individualism, medicalization and personal tragedy 
theory. And who benefits? According to Oliver, capitalism benefits for: 
disabled people may perform an economic function as part of the reserve pool 
of labour and an ideological function in being maintained in their position of 
inferiority. Thus they serve as a warning to those unable or unwilling to work 
(Oliver, p.70). 
While disability is a particular form of oppression (Abberley, 1987), it would be 
wrong to consider it one dimensional; it is in fact multi-dimensional. Many disabled 
people suffer the additional burden of racial and/or sexual oppression which structures 
their experience of disability in particular ways (Brown, 1985; Wicks, 1991 ). 
Before I continue Oliver's political programme, I would like to point to a number of 
problems I have with his and similar analyses. Amongst my concerns are the tendency to 
romanticize disability and disabled people's lives in the pre-capitalist era, and to cast 
disability solely as a product of capitalism; to fudge the issue of physiology and degree of 
impairment; the tendency to treat the disability community as a homogeneous unit is 
also problematic. I am addressing these problems elsewhere. 
Oliver's programme of emancipation for and by disabled people 
In developing his social theory of disability Oliver uses a framework derived from 
historical materialism to show that the dominant view of disability as an individual 
medical problem is created by "the productive forces, material conditions and social 
relations of capitalism" (Oliver, 1990, p.132). However, in developing his political 
programme he rejects Marxism (p.25) and any possibility for a transition to socialism in 
the foreseeable future. Rather, he pessimistically predicts an extension of capitalist 
forces, conditions and relations of production in "post-capitalist" society. 
Notwithstanding this, Oliver is optimistic about the possibility for an improvement in 
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the material conditions and social relations of disability in post-capitalist society. His 
optimism rests primarily upon the "rise of a strong, vibrant and international disability 
movement" (Oliver., 1990, p.132): a new social movement that will change the 
medicalized perception of disability to one of social oppression. Oliver's optimism 
ultimately rests therefore, upon a ~change in consciousness rather than on any change to 
the economic base. 
Justification for this theoretical shift is provided by Oliver's acceptance of a "post-
materialist paradigm" in which he considers the new social movements within a 
framework derived from the work of Gramsci (1971). From this framework a 
consideration of 3 discrete ar~eas is called for; the economy, the State and civil society, all 
given a sense of unity by the concept of hegemony. Oliver suggests that social 
transfottnation can be achieved for and by disabled people acting within the State and civil 
society. His 2-pronged programme is designed to counter the hegemony of "able-
bodiedness" that unifies the economy, the State and civil society into a force which 
oppresses disabled people. Firstly, within civil society, disabled people must establish a 
strong disability rights movement with the objective of having disability accepted as a 
fot na of institutionalized social oppression like institutionalized racism or sexism. This 
will involve disability rights activists engaging in consciousness-raising activities, 
demonstrations, sit-ins and other fo1 nas of street level political action. Secondly, others 
will simultaneously develop a not uncritical relationship with the State and work within 
political and bureaucratic, State-funded institutions to (i) ensure a greater redistribution of 
resources to disabled people and, (ii) effect legislative ~changes that promote disability 
rights. 
Crossing the borderline between the State and the economy will mean disabled 
people will have to renegotiate their relationship with organised labour. This will be a 
difficult process because labour will have to confront the disableism inherent in its 
appropriation of a hegemonic or privileged role in social transfounation (Sutherland, 
1981), and in its resistance to changing work-practices to facilitate the employment of 
disabled people ('Oliver, 1990). From this perspective, we can see how disabled people 
are caught between the disableist and hegemonic practices of capitalist employers and 
organised labour.. The fanner refuse to employ disabled people because they are not able-
bodied; the latter, by prioritizing able-bodied labour, has never considered the position of 
people disqualified from being the producers of surplus value. Little wonder therefore, 
that Oliver confines his programme to consciousness-raising exercises in civil society, 
and to working within the State to gain disability rights and a greater redistribution of 
resources to disabled people. 
This of course begs the question: how realistic is it for Oliver and disabled people to 
pin their hopes on the goodwill of the non-disabled, and in a resurgence of the w ,elfare 
State given the current domination of New Right ideology? Both Britain, the context 
from which Oliver writes, and Aotearoa-New Zealand have adopted New Right policies 
premised on the retrenchment of the State and the advancement of individual 
entrepreneurialism as solutions to the current economic crisis. The subsequent cuts in 
state spending - benefits last December; housing, health, ~education and welfare services in 
the 1991 Budget - have impacted heavily on those most dependent on those services, 
namely unskilled and low waged workers and beneficiaries - categories to which the 
majority of disabled people belong. If these cutbacks herald the adv~ent of "post-capitalist 
society", then the likelihood of improvements in the material and social conditions of 
disabled people in late capitalism seems bleak, particularly when an "extension of 
capitalist forces, conditions and relations" is predicted (Oliver, 1990., p.l32). 
Marx (1976) argued that the capitalist dynamic depended upon ev~er inc~easing profits 
achieved by reducing the costs of variable capital i. ~e. wag~es and conditions. An 
important instrument for suppressing worker demands is the industrial reserve army, a 
pool of unemployed people waiting to fill the jobs of dissatisfied ,work~ers. Marginal 
groups like disabled people, housewives, im.migrants and black people, complete the 
, , • • I ' • 1 , 
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industrial reserve which pettnits employers to maintain high rates of profit. Further, 
disabled people and other exploited populations, are often "compelled to perfottn routine 
jobs that are neither readily mechanized nor regarded by capitalists as justifying the 
payment of prevailing wages" (Hahn, 1987, p.551 ). Finally, they are available as stop-
gap measures when labour shortfalls occur during times of prosperity or during wars 
when acute shortages of non-disabled labour creates a demand for other workers. From 
this view, disabled people perfottn an important economic function within the capitalist 
state; they maintain profit as part of the industrial reserve or by perfottning tedious work 
at low rates of pay. Under capitalism therefore, it is not in the interests of capital to 
maintain "the disabled,. at much above subsistence level. 
Together, the attacks on the Welfare State and the role of disabled people in the 
reserve army, call for a re-evaluation of Oliver's programme. Where his model breaks 
down is his departure from historical materialism to idealism. For Oliver to insist that at 
one particular historical point material conditions detettnined consciousness, and then to 
formulate a programme which relies on changing consciousness in order to change 
material conditions, demonstrates a remarkable philosophical and theoretical turnabout. 
In practice his programme may result in short term gains during times of economic 
expansion, but these will only be lost in times of economic crisis. (This point is 
developed below in the discussion on the State Sector Act). A programme that aims to 
pertnanently improve the lot of disabled people must not treat ideology as if it exists in a 
vacuum. It must address the material basis of ideology, namely the economic mode of 
production and issues related to the economic surplus. Issues such as who produces the 
surplus; why certain groups are systematically excluded from the production process; who 
owns the surplus produced; on what basis is it to be distributed throughout the 
population, must be addressed. Such a programme will, of necessity, include a 
rapprochement between disabled people and organised labour, as well as establishing links 
with women, black people and other minority groups oppressed by the mechanisms of 
capital. The development of collective strategies to transfoun the material basis of the 
ideology which divides each of these groups, both within and without, will then be 
possible. One can imagine that such a strategy will involve a transition from an 
economic mode of production organized for private profit to one organized for public 
good. For disabled people, the advantage of a collectivist approach is twofold: frrstly, it 
is naive to think we can effect permanent change on our own and, secondly, the process 
of negating stereotyped images of disabled people will be advanced. 
While Oliver's programme is questionable, the analysis underpinning his social 
theory of disability is of value. Although it was developed with reference to the British 
context, it still has explanatory power when trying to understand how disability is 
conceptualized in New Zealand: we have a heritage of British values, both countries share 
a Westminster style parliamentary and legal system and, for most of this century, a 
commitment to the Welfare State. In the remainder of the paper Oliver's model will be 
applied in an analysis of the social policy bearing on disability in Aotearoa-New Zealand. 
The primary focus will be on the ways in which the possibilities, employment patterns 
and location of disabled people in the labour market are structured by disability social 
policy. 
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4. Disability, social policy and employment 
Disability is e~sentially whatever public laws and programmes say it is (Hahn, 
1987, p.182). 
Disability social policy is articulated in legislation which defmes disability in tenns 
of individual pathology (Social Secwity Act 1938, Rehabilitation Act 1941, Disabled 
Persons Employment Promotion Act, 1960 (DPEP), Accident Compensation Act 1972) 
and/or physical and mental impaiunent (Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 
(DPCW)). Having thus defined the problem, the public provision of tteatment, 
rehabilitation and short- and long-teun ~care of individuals within a medical setting was 
stipulated as the solution. 
Social policy 1: medicalizing disability 
Medical hegemony was ~established over disabled people via the Social Security Act 
which legally sanctioned 1nedical intervention in their lives. Under the tet n1s of the act, 
the "health and general welfar~e of the ~community" was to be sustained by medical 
intervention in those New Zealanders with "disabilities arising from age, sickness, ... and 
other exceptional circumstances". The "problem" of disability was thereby individualized, 
defined as arising from a personal situation, and shifted into the medical realm where, 
within the limits of technology, functional deficit was to be cured or reduced. The Act 
also provided for monetary compensation in the fo1111 of benefits to be paid to these 
unfortunate individuals. 
Where medical intervention is not successful, the individual patient passes into a 
system of rehabilitation where he or she is counselled to live with his or her deficit. 
Vocational retraining in fot1ns of work suited to the impait 1nent reinforce the message 
that disability is an individual problem fequiring an individual to adapt to society. Where 
an individual's deficit excludes him or her from open employment, sheltered ~employment 
is provided. Such programmes were first difected at disabh:~d ex-servicemen (Disabled 
Soldiers Re-establishment Act 1930; Rehabilitation Act 1941) but in 1954 they were 
extended to civilians with the ~establishm~ent of a National Civilian Rehabilitation 
Com.mittee which later became the Rehabilitation League NZ (Inc). In a nationwide 
network of training centres, the League undertook the assessment, counselling and 
vocational (re )training of disabled people ,as well as providing sheltered ~employment for 
those incapable of full employment (Pirie, 1977; Bolt & Heggie, 1982). Such 
orientation reflects the penetration of medical conceptions of disability into the 
rehabilitation process which presumes that the disabled person is unemployed because of 
a deficit; that a person's capacity to work is detennined largely by his or her individual 
capabilities. Such an assumption may have had validity in an economy founded upon 
manual labour, but as Hahn (1986, p.126) observes "its relevance to an economy based 
primarily upon the provision of services or advanced technology might be subjected to 
increased scrutiny". More fundamentally, the "flawed individual" approach ignores the 
issues of architectural barriers, social discrimination, employer prejudice and directs 
energies towards restructuring the psychological and vocational behaviour of clients. 
From this point of view, successful rehabilitation can be ~characterized as the lived 
expression of the ideologies of individualism and personal tragedy. In the process, more 
severely disabled persons ar~e persuaded by m~edical professionals (doctors, nurses, 
counsellors, psychologists, occupational and physiotherapists, social workers) to accept 
medical explanations of disability and to blame themselves, not social factors, for the 
disabling consequences of their physical impainnents. As medical explanations are 
internalized, disabled people are turned into docile subjects and are set up for exploitation 
in the labour market. Belief in their ascribed inferior status and capabilities is confu naed 
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by the passivity with which disabled people accept high rates of unemployment resulting 
from employer discrimination, and the alacrity and gratefulness with which many will 
accept whatever employment is offering. It is not surprising therefore, to find disabled 
people concentrated in low paid, low skill jobs with no pathways to career development. 
Having said this, it would be a mistake to assign gratefulness to all disabled people 
employed in menial, repetitive work. Many are, in fact, very disgruntled with their pay 
and working conditions, but are forced to work oui of economic necessity and/or for the 
secondary gains of social contact and the status that comes with being in paid 
employment. Such people may well be colonized, but I feel it is a mistake for Oliver to 
overlook them. They may well come in contact with disabled activists who introduce 
them to the social creation model of disability. Liberated from their colonial shackles, 
they potentially provide (i) the nexus for a rapprochement with organized labour and, (ii) 
points of entry for disabled people to become actively involved in reorganization at an 
economic level. This raises several questions: why the need for a rapprochement with 
organized labour? what are the historical reasons for disabled people not having a higher 
profile in the union movement in Aotearoa-New Zealand? One answer lies in sheltered 
employment and the central role it has played in the "rehabilitation" of so many disabled 
people in Aotearoa-New Zealand. 
Social policy 2: the promotion of exploitation 
The Disabled Persons Employment Promotion Act 1960 (DPEP) approved sheltered 
workshops for civilians and allowed exemption from specific provisions in legislation, 
awards or collective agreement for organizations providing sheltered workshops for 
disabled persons. However, before granting approval to any organization the Minister of 
Labour (now Employment) was bound under section 5 to "consult" with unions, the 
national organization of employers and the national organization of workers. Depending 
upon how "consult" is interpreted, a number of ways in which disabled workers might 
have been viewed by the unions is suggested. On the one hand, "consult" could have 
been interpreted as "directive" by the Minister, leaving the unions little say in the matter. 
On the other hand, a Minister may well have consulted with the unions, which, in the 
interest of protecting their own workers' from under-rate disabled labour, complied with 
the Minister's "approval or recommendation". .A third perspective, from a disabled 
person's point of view, interprets the provisions of the DPEP as logical given the 
uncontested dominance of the medical model of disability. The ongoing exploitation of 
disabled people in sheltered workshops merely confirnts the complicity of the State, 
employers and labour in the oppression of disabled people. This interpretation is 
probably the most accurate, given that it is only in the last 10 years that disabled people 
in Aotearoa-New Zealand have collectively begun to challenge the medical model and to 
articulate their perspectives themselves. 
However, there is reason to believe that the trade unions are beginning to take the 
concerns of disabled workers more seriously. This is evidenced by the appointment last 
year of a disabled person by the Auckland Council of Trade Unions to infoun and 
coordinate union representation and activities for and with disabled workers. Another 
example demonstrates both the power the Act gives medically oriented organizations to 
exploit workers in their sheltered workshops and the changing relationship between 
organized labour and disabled people in Aotearoa-New Zealand. 
Recent attempts by workers at an Auckland sheltered employment site to negotiate a 
modest increase in wages and conditions were met with a refusal on the part of the 
executive to negotiate. Frustrated, the workers approached the appropriate union for help 
which was readily forthcoming. A union representative subsequently spent hours in 
consultation with the workers on a number of occasions, listening to their grievances and 
explaining the benefits of union membership and the responsibilities that come with 
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honouring awards. On learning of this, the executive called the workers to a meeting and 
told them that their involvement with a union was illegal under the DPEP Act and that, 
furtheunore, they only had to give an hours notice before firing any person employed by 
the organisation. Defeated and intimidated the workers retwned to work. 
In presenting their ultimatum, the non-disabled, salaried executive implied that they 
too were victims of the Act and that it was state compulsion that denied workers union 
representation. There was no mention that an organization had to apply voluntarily to 
have the provisions of the Act applied to its workshops. A few weeks later the workers 
were awarded a slight increase in pay but were refused holiday and sick pay. This directs 
us towards a consideration of voluntary agencies as service providers in the disability 
field. 
Role or the voluntary agencies At this point it is useful and enlightening to 
turn our attention to those born with a congenital disability, and the role voluntary 
agencies have played in structuring disability and the lives of disabled people in Aotearoa-
New Zealand. There has been a long history of inter-relation between statutory provision 
and the services offered by organizations such as the Crippled Children Society (now 
CCS), the Intellectually Handicapped Children Society (now IHC), the New Zealand 
Institute for the Blind, and numerous smaller agencies covering a variety of disabilities. 
The larger voluntary organizations hav~e subsequently played an important part in 
structuring the social perception of disability and the lives of many disabled people in 
Aotearoa-New Zealand. For example, orthopaedic surgeons frustrated in their attempts to 
establish outpatient services and aftercare for ~children with polio, founded the Crippled 
Children Society in 1925. After polio was ·eradicated, they turned their attention to 
cerebral palsy, thus beginning the categorization and medicalization of physical disability 
in Aoteafoa-New .Zealand (Hunt, 1988). Thus, from its inception, the CCS has viewed 
and presented disability from a medi~cal perspective which defines and objectifies 
individuals in terms of functional impairment. Efforts were not directed at changing 
social attitudes and the removal of barriers, but towards adapting impaired children to 
society: the focus was always on the i.mpait tnent. 
This approach has paid off for a number of individuals not in need of much 
adjusunent. Excellent work has been done by voluntary agencies in educating and 
preparing for open employment many of their clients who fell into this category. They 
also provided invaluable support to many families struggling to provide for their 
physically or intellectually impair~ed children. However, another pattern emerges when 
listening to the experiences of people who passed through the r~esidential and outpatient 
facilities provided by the larger organizations. 
These were inevitably organized along medical lines, under-funded and largely 
dependent upon charity for operating costs. This ethos not only associated disability with 
poverty and inferiority, but also penetrated the cultures with disastrous consequences for 
residents. On the one hand, it inevitably attracted some staff and volunteers alike who, 
motivated by the "do-gooder mentality", came to work in the organizations where they 
could help the "pitiable" and "tragic" victims. On the other, it determined policy, for: 
this [charity] model allows policymakers and providers of services to assume 
responsibility for decisions taken and methods used without any consultation 
... The consequences of the system based on the notion that people requiring 
help are "'patients" [is that) daily routines are structured round the needs of 
others, for example meals around kitchen staffing rosters and bedtimes to suit 
nursing shifts .. . such a philosophical base deprives people of initiative, 
~especially if they are dependent on olhers, as they are sometimes made to fe.el 
they must be grateful and not complain, or "rock the boat" (Hunt~ 1988, p. 784-
785). 
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Within the residential homes, the socialization of disabled children into an inferior 
and dependent status continued with the denial of education. Physically and intellectually 
impaired children alike were often considered not worth educating or, alternatively, 
provided with such inferior schooling that they seldom achieved beyond elementary 
levels. At school-leaving age, their vocational options were limited to specialized 
training in, say, packing pegs or folding cigarette cartons in the organization's sheltered 
workshops. Their dependence, passivity and sense of inferiority and powerlessness is 
complete. To the outside world, the inferiority of disabled people generally is confun1ed 
by those who have been trained to perf or 111 routine tasks in sheltered workshops, as is the 
connection between physical and intellectual disability. More importantly, the tragic 
images of disabled people are authenticated and disability is perceived as an exclusively 
negative condition, something to be avoided at all cost. 
But, as Hunt (1988) points out, there is another side to the charity ethic. Because 
voluntary organizations are dependent upon charity for funding, fundraising is an 
important activity. Frequently the methods used demean all disabled people. For 
example, the depiction of helpless and pitiable people, especially cute children, could 
always be depended upon to get the charity dollar. Today, in a sense of 
misenlightenment, fundraisers confront us with the equally demeaning image of a "super-
cripp" heroically confronting and coming to terms with her (crippled women are 
politically correct today) "challenge" - with the indispensable help of the organization of 
course! In either case, disabled people are exploited by the organizations purporting to 
help them. Most of the funds do, after all, go to provide supported employment for a 
bureaucracy and professional elite composed largely of non-disabled people. 
From the above, we can see the pivotal role voluntary agencies have played, and still 
play, in structuring the social perception of disability and the lives of people either born 
disabled or disabled early in life. Caught at an early age in a closed system of long-tenn 
residential care-inferior education-dependence-sheltered employment-exploitation, these 
people have little chance of resisting dominant conceptions. Many cannot help but be 
colonized by the implicit messages contained within the practices consequent to medical 
explanations of disability: their physically impaired bodies hav~e been worked upon to 
produce dependent, passive, disabled subjects. 
However, it would be misleading to characterize the voluntary organizations as 
rogues operating without social approval. Succeeding governments have been happy for 
these institutions to fill in the gaps created by their under-funding of public provision; 
there has been no ground swell of outraged public opinion demanding a better deal for 
disabled people. Rather, the people of Aotearoa-New Zealand hav~e been happy for, some 
would say demanding of, the voluntary agencies to provide the repositories for the 
disabled rejects of society; for the "children" who never become adults and who are best 
sheltered in segregated residences and workshops. From this perspective, the voluntary 
organizations and the institutional care they provide, are best understood as the products 
of the disableist hegemony which defines disability and consists of the interrelated and 
interdependent ideologies of individualism, medicalization and personal tragedy theory. 
Social policy 3: flirting with social theories of disability 
The Disabled Persons Community Welfare .Act 1975 (DPCW) contains a mixture of 
provision based on medical and social conceptions of disability. It defines disability in 
ter1ns of individual pathology and makes provision for the rehabilitation of individuals so 
afflicted. In a departure from the medical model, the social issue of access is addressed in 
2 ways. First suspensory loans may be granted to carry out alterations to make a disabled 
person's home accessible. Second, building code 4121 made it illegal to erect physically 
inaccessible buildings for public use in public space. 
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However, Code 4121 has been honoured more in the breach through exemption and 
lack of enforcement (Hunt, 1988, p.789) raising serious questions about the faith in 
which the Act was passed. Notwithstanding this, the provisions of the DPCW Act mark 
a substantial conceptual change. Inaccessible public buildings were recognized as a key 
source of disability; they compounded the disabling effects of functional impairment. 
Within limits their construction was outlaw,ed. 
Social policy 4: legalising the oppression of disabled people 
With the DPCW Act, the means to ·eliminate ar~chitectural barriers to the 
employment of disabled persons in public space was now available. However, the means 
to remove attitudinal barriers have still to be enacted. Under the Human Rights 
~Commission Act 1977 discrimination on the grounds of sex, marital status, and religious 
and ethical belief is unlawful. By omission, this Act legalizes discrimination against 
physically impaired people, especially in the labour market. In my own research, I have 
uncovered blatant instances of employer prejudice, discrimination and exploitation: the 
person who was refused employment on the grounds that her facial paralysis would 
"frighten clients"; of the person who uses crutches seeing "No in employers eyes as soon 
as they saw the crutches"; and the paraplegic who had to prove himself by working 3 
weeks without pay before been put on the payroll. 
The years of work put in by disabled people to have this situation remedied appear to 
be paying off. A Bill which will combine the Race Relations Act 1971, the Human 
Rights Commission Act 1977 and extend human rights to disabled people has been 
introduced to Parliament 
Social policy 5: the State Sector Act 1988 - incorporating a social 
theory or disability. 
Equal employment opportunity (EEO) policy had been developing within the State 
sector since 1983. In 1988 it became mandatory under the State Sector Act for 
government departments to develop and implement EEO programmes. Five target groups 
- Maori, women, Pacific Island people, people from ethnic minority gfOups, people with 
disabilities - were identified as needing specific programmes which should aim to identify 
and eliminate all aspects of policies, procedures and other fonns of institutional barriers 
that cause or perpetuate inequality in the employment of persons or &fOups of persons 
(State Services Commission, 1990, p.5). 
Under the Act, departments wer~e required to publish each year their EEO 
programmes, as well as ensure compliance with it; a summary and an account of the 
extent to which the department was able to meet the requirements of the EEO programme 
.must also be published in annual reports. The promotion and development of each 
department's EEO policies was to be monitored by the State Services Commission 
(SSC). What the State Sector Act intended was the removal of impediments to State 
employers choosing the best person for the job, and the enhancement of State sector 
efficiency by providing the structures for .managers to make the most of the skills and 
potentials of all staff. 
In relation to disability, the State Sector Act 1988 is pot~entially the most 
progressive piece of legislation passed in our history. It provides .mechanisms for 
organizational change which, theoretically, will see the elimination of disabling 
structures and facilitate the recruitment and career development of physically impaired 
people in the State sector. EEO provisions wer~e extended to the private sector by the 
Employment Equity Act 1990. However, the Employment Equity Act was repealed 
shortly after the National Government took office in November 1990. Led by the 
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Employers' Federation, the argument for repeal had turned about the "equal pay for work 
of equal value" debate, and the threat this would pose to profit margins and the 
accumulation of capital. 
Although I have argued elsewhere that material circumstances detetanine the general 
character of consciousness historically, Peter Leonard (1984) reminds us that there is, at 
any given point, a dialectical relationship between them. He argues that "states of mind, 
intentions, can also change material circumstances, though always within historically 
detetanined limits such as the availability of resources and level of scientific development" 
(Leonard, 1984, p.25). Since Disability-EEO (D-EEO) began as an idea vtritten in law, 
then the degree to which it has become a "state of mind" in the public service, and the 
extent to which the material circumstances of disabled people in the State sector have 
improved, are worth examining. This can only be accomplished within a general 
assessment of EEO. 
In her review ofEEO and State sector refonn, Marianne Tremaine (1991) argues that 
the goals of EEO directly oppose the methods and direction of refoun in the State sector. 
Theories espousing the uninhibited activity of the market as the best way of achieving 
desired goals have been the main driving force behind State sector reform. Public 
servants who founally administered rules were required to metamorphose into managers 
that take responsibility for the decisions they make. Opposing the free-market thrust, 
from a much weaker position, are EEO policies premised upon liberal assumptions of 
market intervention in the pursuit of equality for disadvantaged groups. 
In the prevailing climate of efficiency, effectiveness and economy, Tremaine details 
the reluctance with which managers will divert scarce resources to implement EEO 
programmes. Window dressing has therefore been the name of the game with 
departments publishing EEO programmes but under-resourcing the execution of those 
plans. "Managers have," according to Tremaine, "made the assumption that measures of 
their success will give less weight to EEO than to the other three Es" (Tremaine, 1991, 
p.364). 
Notwithstanding this, Tremaine says that the idea of EEO is widely understood 
throughout the public sector. Put another way, we could say that public sector 
consciousness had changed in regards to EEO. In seeking an answer to the question, 
"Have solid improvements occurred?", Tremaine turns to the target groups: 
it is not the plan itself that matters, but the progress the plan makes possible 
... EEO works almost as a smokescreen, hiding the lack of activity behind 
bureaucratic structures and procedures. Some would say that EEO has done no 
harm but little good. Others would say that EEO has provided a useful 
appearance of reformist activity, while masking the reality of reactionary 
conservatism and inaction (Tremaine, 1991, p.365). 
With regards to D-EEO, Tremaine depressingly notes that departments moving 
towards corporatization do not want to employ disabled people, and that, overt 
discrimination against health impaired employees and those with disabilities was 
increasing (Tremaine, 1991, p.363). 
From Tremaine's account, it seems clear that under-resourcing has meant that EEO 
has lacked a solid material base and remains mere ideology. As evidenced above, for 
some target-group members, EEO has become oppressive insofar as it promised so much 
but has delivered relatively little. Also, EEO is thr~eatening to non-target group co-
workers who mistakenly believe that EEO implies special rather than equal treatment for 
target group members. This can produce tensions and jealousies between the 2 groups as 
well as providing subversive and erroneous explanations as to why target group members 
might be advancing in their careers. In short, given the highly competitive and market-
oriented ethos prevailing within the State sector, EEO could be seen as damaging the very 
people it was designed to help. 
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Tremaine's assessment has been criticized for imbalance by people closely associated 
with EEO. In their opinion, she is overly negative primarily because she did not consult 
widely enough with people involved in the implementation of EEO throughout the State 
sector, and also for using selected infotnaants. They highlight not only the baining of 
general staff in EEO issues, but also the university scholarships, senior management and 
career developm~ent programmes, and time off for networking activities, as significant 
gains already in place for target group members. They direct attention to departments 
such as Social Welfare, Education and the SSC where EEO has become an important part 
of departmental culture. EEO ~coordinators argue that together these structures represent 
real and significant advances which Tremaine has overlooked. However, disappointment 
is exp~essed over the exceedingly slow pace of change, and also broad agreement with 
Tfemaine's assertion that issues of economy are generally given priority over EEO.l 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that D-EEO has been hit the hardest by the new 
managerialism. This occurs at 2 lev~els. First, at an ideological level, the pervasiv~e and 
deep-seated ideology of able-bodiedness negates disabled people in all situations (see 
SSC's census on ethnicity and disability, 1988). Further evidence of this is to be found 
in the popularity of Mainstream, a programme in which the SSC subsidises the wag~es of 
disabled people for the first 5 y~ears. This shows that, by and large, government 
departments will only employ disabled people if they are paid to do so. Further, it 
implies that departments do not believe that disabled people can perfonn, and that, more 
properly, they should be the recipients of charity. Also, disabled people are often 
arbitrarily discounted from promotion on the grounds of efficiency and effectiveness. My 
informant was not surprised, therefore, by the fact that within the State sector most 
disabled people are confined to repetitive, basic grade positions with minimal prospects 
ior further training and career development. 
Secondly, at a material l~evel, D-EEO appears to be carrying a lot of the ",can" for 
financial restraint. For example, it is a bitter irony that the Justice Department affords 
full time advocacy for all target groups ~except disability. It is assumed common practice 
to similarly downgrade D-EEO in other departments. Also, relatively fewer fesources in 
the fonn of scholarships and courses in career development are available for the disability 
target group. 
Returning to Leonard's thesis that states of mind and intentions can change material 
circumstances providing resources are available within historically detennined limits, then 
the evidence suggests that it is the wrong time for D-EEO. Wrong, because ov~er the last 
7 years New Right ideology has dominated in all sectors of the State, building an ethic 
and culture of competitive individualism in which "efficiency" dominates as an objective 
over "equity" (Peters and Marshall, 1990). In this climate, D-EEO personnel wage an 
uphill battle against managers who, while supporting EEO "in principle", are not 
prepared to release the resources necessary to turn principles into material reality. At this 
particular point in the State sector's history, it is obvious that "states of mind and 
intentions" are not sufficient to radically change the material conditions of employment 
for disabled people. 
5. Reflections on d·isabil.ity EEO 
Together the State Sector Act and the Employment Equity Act provided the 
mechanism for the elimination of some of the major social structures which transform 
physical impai11nent into oppressive disability. While it was not "up-front" disability 
social policy, the State Sector Act represents a quantum leap forward in th~e 
reconceptualization of disability: it confers legal status on the notion that disability is the 
product of social processes and social organization. Further, EEO policy has the 
1 Personal conversation, 1991. 
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potential to infect and change the way people think about disability by changing their 
practises in that important area of everyday life - the workplace. With organizational 
change and the provision of technology (State Services Commission, 1990, p.20), 
physically impaired people would have been incorpomted into the mainstream of daily life 
as independent, adult subjects. It is tragic therefore, that the Employment Equity Act has 
been repealed and that, within the State sector, under-resourcing has denied D-EEO a 
material base ensuring it remains largely a "state of mind". 
My earlier criticism of Oliver is born out by the path EEO, especially D-EEO, has 
followed in Aotearoa-New Zealand. It demonstrates that while a capitalist state can 
change laws in favour of oppressed groups, laws will only produce positive material 
change so long as they do not threaten the private accumulation of capital. For this 
reason, one would have expected EEO to have been enthusiastically and fully 
implemented in the State sector where the notion of public service has traditionally taken 
priority over turning a profit. However, the ascendency of the N·ew Right has 
transfonned the public sector so that increasingly it resembles the capitalist workplace 
where, according to Mandel: 
a worker cannot be seen as a human being endowed with elementary rights, 
dignity and needs ... He [sic] is a 'cost element' ... constantly and exclusively 
measured in money terms, in order to be reduced to the utmost. Even whe.n 
'human relations' and 'psychological considerations' are introduced into labour 
organization, they are all centred in the last analysis upon 'eco1Wmies of cost' 
(Emphasis added; Mandel, 1976, p.65) 
The italicized portion of the above quotation is prophetic of the course D-EEO has 
followed in Aotearoa-New Zealand. It also confnans my view that any programme aimed 
at permanently improving the material conditions of disabled people must address the 
economic mode of production and the ideologies that mask the contradiction between 
socialized production and the private, capitalist fotnt of appropriation. Without changing 
the material conditions that generate the organic ideology of individualism, and the 
arbitrary ideologies of medicalization and personal tragedy theory, disabled people will 
remain oppressed. Whether that oppression continues to take the fo1n1 of material and 
social depravation, as at present, or is expressed as dependency upon the largesse of 
capital to support EEO and better than subsistent welfare provision, remains to be seen. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Both the medical and social models of disability are best understood as products of 
the modem capitalist era. The medical model evolved as an instrument of the Welfare 
State to separate out paupers deserving of aid. Thus the focus was on individual 
functional impairment and inability to work. The subsequent provision of aid in the 
fotan of medical and institutional care had the effect of linking disability with disease and 
pathology while isolating disabled people from their communities. Concomitant with 
this approach was a social perception of disabled people as pitiable, dependent and tragic 
victims of fate deserving of charity. 
In contradistinction, the social model reconceptualizes disability as a social creation, 
and disabled people as a minority oppressed by social, political and economic institutions 
which privilege "able" bodies over disabled people. A materialist, social theory posits 
that disabled people have been created by their exclusion from capitalist production which 
demands agile, individual wage labour to operate complex machinery in industrial 
processes. The exclusion of disabled people is legitimated by the ideologies of 
individualism which promotes the competitive, independent and property owning 
individual, medicalization which sanctions medical intervention, and personal tragedy 
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